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Personal identity
In philosophy, the matter of personal identity〔(Personal Identity ) (Encyclopedia of Philosophy )〕 deals with such questions as, "What makes it true that a person at one time the same thing as a person at another time?" or "What kinds of things are we persons?" The term "identity" in "personal identity" refers to "numerical identity," where saying that X and Y are numerically identical just means that X and Y are the same thing. Personal identity is not the same as personality, though some theories of personal identity maintain that continuity of personality may be required for one to persist through time. In relation to answer questions about persistence, such as under what conditions a person does or does not continue to exist, contemporary philosophers often seek to first answer questions about what sort of things we are, most fundamentally. Many people claim we are animals, or organisms, but many others strongly believe that no person can exist without mental traits, such as consciousness. Since an organism can exist without consciousness, both these views cannot be true (if we are organisms we can exist without being conscious; but if we can't exist without consciousness, we are not organisms). Thus, in order to determine whether certain features (such as consciousness) are crucial to a person's continued existence, it may be important to first ask what sort of things we are.
Generally, personal identity is the unique numerical identity of a person in the course of time.〔(Personal Identity ) (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)〕〔(Identity ) (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)〕 That is, the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a person at one time and a person at another time can be said to be the ''same'' person, persisting through time;〔 or, the essence of a self-conscious person, that which enables the person to be uniquely what him- or herself, and which further persists over time, despite superficial modifications, making him or her same person at different times.〕
In contemporary metaphysics, the matter of personal identity is referred to as the ''diachronic problem'' of personal identity.〔Greek: Διαχρονικός (Diahronikos)〕〔An Essay Concerning Human Understanding; Volumes 1-3. By John Locke〕 The ''synchronic problem'' concerns the question of: What features and traits characterize a person at a given time.〔.〕 In Continental philosophy and in Analytic philosophy, enquiry to the nature of Identity is common. Continental philosophy deals with conceptually maintaining identity when confronted by different philosophic propositions, postulates, and presuppositions about the world and its nature.〔Self and Subjectivity; "Identity, Sex, and the Metaphysics of Substance". Edited by Kim Atkins. p257.〕〔Cultural Theory: An Anthology. Edited by Imre Szeman, Timothy Kaposy. p481. "Identity, Sex, and the Metaphysics of Substance"〕
==Theories==
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